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Reframing Suicide in
the Military
George R. Mastroianni and Wilbur J. Scott

S

ince 2001, the suicide rate among members of our military has increased
dramatically. This increase occurred despite improving behavioral health
conditions for American forces serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.1 The public
response to this alarming and paradoxical trend largely has been to blame
the usual suspects when bad things happen in our military: stress, the strain
of intense operations and repetitive deployments, and the hardships of military life. Proposals to address the problem of suicide have also trod familiar
ground: more money, more programs, more chaplains, expansion of mental
health resources, more research on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and
Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), new training modules, increased awareness, and
better screening and treatment for those we think are at risk. Nevertheless,
suicides continue to occur at unusually high rates in the military. We will argue
that our current understanding of this problem is incomplete, and that, as a
nation, our approach to suicide in the military needs to be reframed.

Scope of the Problem
The suicide rate in the United States in 2001 was about 10.7 per 100,000
and in 2006 was virtually unchanged at 11.1 per 100,000, translating into
approximately 30,000 deaths by suicide each year. In contrast to this stability,
the suicide rate in the Army was 9.0 per 100,000 in 2001 but rose sharply to
19.3 per 100,000 in 2008. Rates in the Marine Corps were 16.7 in 2001 and
19.9 per 100,000 in 2008.2 In fiscal year 2009, the Army lost more soldiers to
suicide and accidental death than to combat fatalities.3 Meanwhile, during this
same period, rates in the Navy and Air Force remained relatively steady (10.0 to
11.7 for the Navy and 10.1 to 12.6 for the Air Force). In sum, virtually all of the
increase in the DOD suicide rate has taken place in the two ground services that
have borne the brunt of the deployment burden in Iraq and Afghanistan. This
would seem to provide an initial clue about where to start and what to consider
in accounting for the overall increase in military suicides.

Current Approaches
The RAND Corporation recently issued a report on suicide in the military
that begins with the assumption that the increase in suicide rates is attributable to
George Mastroianni and Wilbur Scott are professors in the Department of Behavioral
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stress, particularly stress associated with repetitive deployments. For example,
the opening paragraph of the RAND report’s summary observes:
Since late 2001, U.S. military forces have been engaged in conflicts
around the globe, most notably in Iraq and Afghanistan. These conflicts have exacted a substantial toll on soldiers, marines, sailors,
and airmen, and this toll goes beyond the well-publicized casualty
figures. It extends to the stress that repetitive deployments can have
on the individual service member and his or her family. This stress
can manifest itself in different ways—increased divorce rates, spouse
and child abuse, mental distress, substance abuse—but one of the
most troubling manifestations is suicides, which are increasing across
the Department of Defense (DoD).4

Given the RAND report’s strong emphasis on repetitive deployments as
a stressor associated with increased suicides, it is perhaps surprising to discover
that the 2009 Department of Defense Suicide Evaluation Report finds only 7
percent of military suicides occurred among servicemembers with multiple
deployments.5 According to the same DOD report, while 51 percent of military suicides had been deployed at some time to Iraq or Afghanistan, only 17
percent had experienced combat. Many suicides happen among junior enlisted
soldiers; repetitive deployments are more common among senior noncommissioned officers.
In 2010, the Army released its own comprehensive Health Promotion,
Risk Reduction, Suicide Prevention Report (Army HP/RR/SP Report).6
Carefully reviewing a wealth of data, the report emphasizes two factors: (1)
lapses in garrison leadership supervision and control, and (2) the lowering of
recruitment standards (through increased use of waivers) during the years of
high operational tempo, thereby admitting more recruits given to “high risk
behavior” (alcohol or drug abuse and brushes with the law). The report focuses
on this “troubling subset of our [the Army’s] population” as a “subculture” prone
to high-risk behavior which drives the Army’s suicide rate higher. According
to the report:
[This section] will demonstrate that we are creating and sustaining a
high risk population that is a subset of the Army population. Several
factors including an increase in enlistment waivers (e.g., misconduct)
combined with a decrease in separations have led to a small cohort
that may be more likely to abuse drugs and alcohol while engaging in
increased levels of high risk and criminal activity.7

The Army HP/RR/SP Report focuses on misconduct and “highrisk behavior,” but the 2009 Department of Defense Suicide Event Report
(DODSER) shows that relatively few servicemembers who committed suicide
during calendar year 2009 had a history of Absent Without Leave (AWOL) (10
percent), Articles 15 (15 percent), or civilian legal problems (12 percent).8 Fewer
than one third (27 percent) had been experiencing job-related difficulties.

Summer 2011

7

George R. Mastroianni and Wilbur J. Scott

Theoretical Approaches to Suicide
Durkheim on Suicide
Suicide is simultaneously an individual and a social act. Many of us
intuitively view suicide primarily in individual terms and might find it ironic
that a classic treatise on suicide was written by a sociologist. French sociologist Emile Durkheim9 chose it as his subject matter in the latter years of the
nineteenth century for that very reason.10 At the time, the field of sociology was
struggling with its substantive and scientific identity. Durkheim sought to set
the record straight. If society was nothing more than the sum of its individuals
and their psyches, he argued, sociology had no unique subject matter. But when
individuals connect to form a society, society itself becomes a thing with a
life and properties of its own. He sought to demonstrate this point by studying
fluctuations in the incidence of suicide.
France in those years already had a long history of collecting vital
statistics, especially birth and death records. During the early nineteenth
century, French statistician Andre-Michel Querry developed techniques for
presenting these and other kinds of data in maps to illustrate their temporal
regularities and covariation with “causal” variables.11 This enabled Durkheim
to draw upon reams of statistical data in presenting and testing his ideas. He
sought to show that, in order for a society to sustain itself over time, it must
meet certain “needs,” most centrally those of “regulation” and “integration.”
These terms have slightly different meanings in English than in French, but in
Durkheim’s thinking they referred respectively to the necessity for well-defined
norms and customs that regulate the interactions and lives of societal members
(regulation), and for sufficiently strong commitments to these collective rules
generated through immersion in group life (integration).

Integration—Egoistic and Altruistic Suicide
By Durkheim’s reasoning, the health of a society should be reflected
in the incidence of suicide and other social ills. Specifically, Durkheim argued
that suicide rates should increase when levels of integration and regulation
are either too low or too high. In other words, a healthy society is one whose
members are sufficiently immersed in group life, whether at home, at work,
or in voluntary associations (such as religious faith and practice), and thus
are influenced by collectively shared ideas of what is appropriate and inappropriate. Where integration is weak, one can expect to see higher rates of
social ills because societal groupings do not adequately sustain and constrain
their members. Central among the ills resulting from erosions in group life,
Durkheim contended, is a rise in a type of suicide he termed “egoistic” to
capture the sense of individuals operating outside sufficient group control. For
example, Durkheim noted that in nineteenth century Europe the suicide rate
among Protestants (then, primarily Lutherans and Calvinists) was higher than
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among Catholics. The difference, he believed, was not because Protestants were
more accepting of suicide—they were not—but rather because Catholicism at
the time more effectively integrated its adherents into a collective community.12
Increases in the level of integration reduce the incidence of suicide, but
not in a linear fashion. There is a point beyond which optimal gains in societal
health are achieved. As the intensity of group bonds exceeds this point, there
occurs another spike in the observed incidence of suicide. Durkheim described
the type of suicide associated with this second increase as “altruistic.” Egoistic
suicide, he observed, was rare in “lower” societies. In contrast, altruistic suicides historically are those understood to be required by custom, particularly
among the elderly (when they can no longer constructively contribute to societal
life), among women upon the death of their husbands, or among followers upon
the death of their chiefs. Durkheim compared the two in this manner: “Now,
when a person kills himself, . . . it is not because he assumes the right to do so
but, on the contrary, because it is his duty. We thus confront a type of suicide
differing by incisive qualities from the preceding one . . . . One occurs because
society allows the individual to escape it . . . ; the other, because society holds
him in too strict tutelage.”13

Regulation—Anomic and Fatalistic Suicide
Variations in regulation—the extent to which norms and customs are
well-defined and effectively enforced—produce similar fluctuations in suicide
rates. Durkheim observed that suicide rates increase during both economic
busts and booms. Why should economic booms and busts both produce more
suicides? Durkheim’s explanation begins with the supposition that human
needs and desires are not curbed by what is required physically to survive but,
rather, are potentially infinite and therefore must be constrained by some force
external to the individual. Social norms and customs serve this purpose and,
once in place and widely accepted by members of a society, provide equilibrium between individual desires and socially-accepted means to satisfy them.
Economic booms and busts disrupt this equilibrium, albeit in different ways:
In normal conditions, the collective order is regarded as just by the
great majority of persons. . . . Since this regulation is meant to restrain
individual passions, it must come from a power that dominates individuals; but this power must also be obeyed through respect, not fear.
. . . But when society is disturbed by some painful crisis or by beneficent but abrupt transitions, it is momentarily incapable of exercising
this influence; thus comes the sudden rises in the curves of suicide.14

While the conditions producing this type of suicide are drawn from
fluctuations in economic cycles, the description points more generally to the
effect of disequilibrium resulting from any violation of established rules and the
resultant breakdown of binding expectations. “Anomic” suicides occur when
“the scale is upset” and “results from man’s activities lacking [sufficient] regulation and his consequent sufferings.” Durkheim concludes: “This and egoistic
suicide have kindred ties. Both spring from society’s insufficient presence in
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individuals. In egoistic suicide [society] is deficient in truly collective activity .
. . . In anomic suicide, society’s influence is lacking in the basically individual
passions, thus leaving them without a check-rein.”15
Durkheim devotes much less attention to “fatalistic” suicide, which
he expects to occur where regulation becomes intensely suffocating. As an
example, he suggests the conditions experienced by those held in slavery.
Perhaps he neglected this type of suicide because he did not find many instances
of it in his nineteenth century French data. Nonetheless, what is common to
all four types of suicide is the importance of the relative levels of “integration” and “regulation”—low levels result in “egoistic” and “anomic” suicides,
respectively, while high levels produce “altruistic” and “fatalistic” suicides.
Somewhere in the middle range exists the sweet spot for a healthy society, and
reciprocally for the health of its individual members. This theory worked well
for Durkheim in demonstrating the study of society as an entity itself. 16 We
believe that this same framework can help us to better understand the problem
of military suicide.

A Modern Perspective
Durkheim’s analysis of suicide illustrates that there are clear associations between structural variables and rates of suicide, but it does not explain
why some individuals who are exposed to distressing societal conditions choose
to end their lives, while others do not. Psychologist Thomas Joiner’s theory
of suicide is far more than an extension or restatement of Durkheim’s view,
but does share some common ground (see Figure 1).17 Joiner emphasizes three
factors as contributing to suicidal potential: (1) failed belongingness, (2) perceived burdensomeness, and (3) habituation to self-injury. Failed belongingness
corresponds to Durkheim’s category of low social integration, which can lead
to egoistic suicide in Durkheim’s scheme. Perceived burdensomeness, where
a person comes to feel he or she is a burden to others, resembles the effect of
excessively high integration Durkheim associated with altruistic suicide.
Joiner postulates that suicide occurs when the desire for suicide (resulting from failed belongingness or perceived burdensomeness) coexists with the
capacity to commit self-injury. He posits that this capacity is acquired through
the process of habituation. Because our natural desire for self-preservation is
so strong, it is difficult for most people to accomplish suicide. Individuals can
habituate, or gradually decrease their response and resistance to self-inflicted
injury by successively approximating fatal behavior. This habituation may be
accomplished by nonfatally injuring oneself physically; by rehearsing such acts
mentally; or even by observing such acts by others. Certain groups with elevated
suicide rates (physicians, for example) may be occupationally exposed to experiences which habituate their response to injury and death, and which also provide
them with ready access to potentially fatal instruments and pharmaceuticals.
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Figure 1. Durkheim and Joiner on Suicide

Higher levels of Disconnectedness/Burdensomeness and of Loss of Belongingness
lead to an increased Likelihood of Suicide only in the presence of High “Self-Injury”
Habituation.
*

This formulation addresses one of the central mysteries of suicide—
why is it so difficult to predict who is at risk for suicide? Some risk factors
are more prevalent among people who commit suicide. For example, alcohol
abuse, substance abuse, and failed relationships occur at much higher rates
among those who commit suicide than among others. There are genetic and
biological factors also known to be associated with suicide, and social and
cultural variables do play an important role.18 Even so, only a very small fraction of people who possess one or more of these other risk factors actually go
on to commit suicide. Joiner’s theory suggests that habituation to self-injury is
one moderating variable in suicide risk; among those with a desire for suicide,
only some have the capacity to attempt or complete the act, and that capacity
is derived in part from habituation to the aversive consequences of self-injury.
In sum, we consider that the desire for suicide arises from failed belongingness or perceived burdensomeness and that it may be acted on by individuals
who have practiced or thought realistically about ending their lives. Because
similar life experiences are not interpreted, understood, and felt in the same
way by all individuals, exposure to similar circumstances and situations might
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lead only some individuals to suicidal thoughts or behavior. This moderating
variable in suicide is the cognitive or mental process by which we construe, or
understand and make sense of, our experiences and feelings. Internal attribution of negative circumstances, difficulty relating to and communicating with
others, emotional dysregulation, and learned helplessness are individual variables which may affect how a person thinks about his or her life and its value.19
Distorted thinking of this sort can lead a person to the conclusion “others would
be better off without me.” This is what Roy Baumeister describes as cognitive deconstruction.20 Baumeister sees this condition as a state in which people
numbly and mechanically go about their lives, and in which impulsive and
self-destructive behavior becomes more likely.

Limits of Current Approaches
Attempts to explain, predict, and prevent suicide run aground on the
shoals of statistical rarity—suicide is exceedingly rare in comparison to its
various associated risk factors. While simple measures of combat exposure
and amount of time deployed do not correlate especially well with suicide risk,
there are some variables (such as alcohol and drug abuse) which clearly do
occur at a higher rate among those who commit suicide. There are a great many
people, however, who abuse alcohol and drugs, the majority of whom do not
commit suicide.
If we wish to understand suicide in the military more clearly, one possible approach is to look for factors identified by the theoretical perspectives
of Durkheim and Joiner, as discussed earlier in this article. Durkheim’s framework points to disruptions in integration and regulation, and Joiner’s to failed
belongingness and perceived burdensomeness. Here, we consider trends, conditions, or events in military and in civilian society over the last several years
that might fit these theoretical perspectives to suggest a different understanding
of, and approach to, suicide in the military.

A Fresh Look at the Problem
Egoistic Suicide Revisited
The Army 2010 HP/RR/SP Report presents clear and dramatic evidence
that the Army has failed to sustain an appropriate level of social integration in
some garrison environments. One tragic incident described in the report seems
to illustrate exactly the circumstances Durkheim might describe as an egoistic
suicide.21 A Sergeant First Class, depressed in part by the loss of friends from
his unit after return from deployment, committed suicide while transitioning to
Drill Sergeant School. Incredibly, his absence went unnoticed and his demise
was not discovered by his unit for nearly five weeks until his landlord called the
Army post to inquire why he had not paid his rent. Soldiers today commonly
report that they form close relationships with their comrades in the military.
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Indeed, personnel policies in the all-volunteer force seem intended to foster
exactly the kind of intense bonding that often occurs among unit members.
Insofar as these policies are successful, they, along with the homogeneity of
the military and the differences between military and civil society, may serve
to accentuate and emphasize the decline in social integration that occurs when
bonds between unit members are disrupted. Disruptions may occur when
deployments end, when soldiers are moved or transferred, or when particular
individuals come and go from a unit.
Such disruptions are less common, and perhaps also less consequential,
in civilian life. Soldiers who experience them without adequate support from
the military may find it difficult to regain a sense of belongingness among civilians with whom they may no longer feel they share much in common. Reserve
Component and National Guard soldiers may be especially vulnerable to this
kind of disruption: they are more likely to return to an environment in which
opportunities to participate in military culture are fewer and less intense than
active component soldiers. On the other hand, reintegration into a preexisting
network of social and family bonds may mitigate the effect for some.
An increased emphasis on compliance with existing rules and regulations pertaining to conduct in garrison and in transit might serve to enhance
the detection of soldiers who display particular risk factors for suicide, such
as alcohol, substance abuse, or family difficulties. The root cause of some
symptoms may be related to a loss of connectedness and integration. If so, the
HS/RR/SP Report’s suggestion to promote social and administrative relationships more consistent with an optimal level of what Durkheim called “social
integration” could have a beneficial effect on suicide rates over the long term.

Altruistic Suicide Revisited
Military life places significant strain on family members. The demands
made by military service are such that spouses and children must necessarily
learn to cope with the challenges of daily life on their own. As family members
become more independent and self-reliant, soldiers may feel less and less
needed. Reunion after separation can bring complex and difficult emotional
challenges—joy on the one hand, but consternation on the other that neither the
soldier nor his or her family members are the same person they were before. The
challenges associated with personal reintegration thus may occur in a context
in which family members seem not just less dependent upon or needful of the
soldier, but perhaps be able to cope more effectively without him/her.

Anomic Suicide Revisited
Anomie occurs when regulation is disrupted. Durkheim offered examples such as disruptions in the business cycle that suddenly alter a person’s
economic and social status, either positively or negatively. More broadly, we
understand anomie as a possible result when there is a disjunction between
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expectations and reality, especially when commonly held ideas, values, and
norms seem no longer to hold. It seems to us that the current state of the
military and of civilian-military relations are rich with potential for changing
circumstances that could lead to anomic responses in some servicemembers.
The HS/RR/SP Report indicts garrison leadership as inadequate, but
asserts confidence in combat leadership: “While our commanders and subordinate leaders are phenomenal warriors, they are unaccustomed to taking care
of Soldiers in a garrison environment.”22 Perhaps this compartmentalization of
dysfunction overlooks a broader impact on military leadership culture over the
last decade. Several high-profile incidents in both Iraq and Afghanistan have
identified failures of leadership as important contributory factors.
The earliest such incident to attract widespread attention was the
detainee abuse that took place in 2003 at Abu Ghraib in Iraq. While soldiers
and NCOs were convicted of crimes, several company- and field-grade officers
were reprimanded, fined, and disciplined for their leadership failures in this
case.23 In 2004, the death of Pat Tillman due to friendly fire in Afghanistan was
followed by revelations of the Army’s subsequent cover-up and deception concerning the true nature of the incident, which came to light only after lengthy
outside investigations.24 In 2005, several Marines were tried in the killings of
24 Iraqi civilians near Haditha, Iraq. The initial investigation was hampered by
leadership lapses in the chain of command.25 In 2006, a group of soldiers from
the 101st Airborne Division raped a young girl and murdered her family in Iraq.
Leadership issues surfaced again during the investigation of this incident.26 In
October of 2009, eight American soldiers were killed at an observation post
(OP Keating) in Afghanistan. Eighteen months later, several officers were disciplined for related leadership failures.27 In early 2010, soldiers from a Stryker
unit murdered Afghan civilians for sport over a period of months. It is thought
by some that the command climate in that unit played a role in these events.28
Running through these incidents is a common thread of ineffective supervision
or poor leadership in the zone of combat.
Although these and incidents like them are exceptional, they receive
a great deal of notoriety. Little may be heard about the countless instances of
exemplary leadership that happen every day in the course of military combat.
Nonetheless, failures such as Abu Ghraib and others should give us pause as we
consider the plausibility of the assertion that garrison leadership in the Army is
in crisis but leadership elsewhere is “phenomenal.” In each of the above-mentioned incidents, it was military leaders who deceived, stonewalled, or outright
failed in their duties. The results of such errors may have an adverse effect on
soldiers’ perceptions of the military more generally. In an earlier paper, we
explicitly addressed this very issue: under certain circumstances, violations
of “psychological contracts”—expectations servicemembers develop, both formally and informally, of the military itself in exchange for their commitment
and service—may lead to disenchantment with the institution, its mission, and
their role within it.29
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The ground services have been severely challenged in Iraq and
Afghanistan, not only by the scale and duration of these conflicts, but also by
their nature. Our military forces began these wars organized for conventional
warfare, but were soon forced to adapt to a role which is both unfamiliar and, for
some, unwelcome. Counterinsurgency is a mode of warfare in which difficult-toresolve tensions permeate every aspect of the conflict. Force protection at times
is pitted against mission effectiveness: the use of violence must be carefully
titrated with positive engagement of the populace to accomplish the mission.
The need to achieve and maintain this balance may well require that otherwise
correctable vulnerabilities be accepted in service of the larger goal.30 Many
soldiers enter combat with expectations and training best adapted to the use
of lethal methods on a known enemy. In the context of recent conflicts, highly
trained soldiers had to learn to operate more flexibly against an enemy whose
members can hide among the very people the military is trying to protect.
This tension may not yet be fully resolved. Over a period of several
years, the Army conducted a series of surveys of soldiers in Iraq, and later
Afghanistan, to assess soldiers’ behavioral health while deployed. Mental
Health Advisory Teams (MHATs) visited the combat zones and conducted
interviews and focus groups with soldiers and behavioral health personnel.31
In 2006, MHAT IV queried soldiers and Marines about “battlefield ethics”
and, while relatively few respondents reported actually witnessing the abuse or
killing of Iraqi civilians or detainees, a majority said that if they were to witness
such an event, they would report it. Only a minority of those surveyed felt
that noncombatants should be treated with dignity and respect. Large majorities of soldiers and Marines reported that they received ethics training, but
substantial numbers (a third of Marines, a quarter of soldiers) said that they
had not received clear guidance from NCOs and officers that they should not
mistreat noncombatants. The subsequent (MHAT V) report showed a rate of
commission of such acts comparable to that seen in MHAT IV, but presented
no results on the issue of reporting such events. Battlefield ethics questions
were eliminated in MHAT VI.32 While there are surely contextual factors that
demand caution from anyone who might wish to judge the behavior of those
whose lives are at risk in combat, it is nonetheless reasonable to consider how
soldiers’ attitudes might reflect the quality of leadership under which they serve
in combat. Relatedly, it is important to consider whether those attitudes are
consistent with American military training and values, and with the expectations of American society.
Recent political and military history has supported what may be an
historically unprecedented deference to military leaders. Cultural differences
persist, however, between military and civilian society. These differences may
be most apparent in the realm of social policy or so-called “values” issues.
A few months ago, when then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited
Afghanistan, he was asked by a Marine sergeant if Marines would be given an
opportunity to “opt out” of their enlistments if they disagreed with the repeal
of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT).” The sergeant reasoned:
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Sir, we joined the Marine Corps because the Marine Corps has a set
of standards and values that is better than that of the civilian sector.
And we have gone and changed those values and repealed the “Don’t
Ask Don’t Tell Policy.”33

Interestingly, polls show that most Americans, and for that matter, most servicemembers,35 disagree with the Marine sergeant’s resistance to the repeal of
DADT as a manifestation of superior values. Conservative political and religious beliefs may be overrepresented in the military in comparison to society
as a whole but there are in fact some strong differences of opinion between segments within the military and civilian society and within the military as well. 35
Polls have shown that for the last several years a majority of Americans
has opposed continuation of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (see Figure 2
below). Figure 2 is not presented to suggest that public opinion about current
conflicts has a causal relationship to the military suicide rate, or vice versa.
Rather, it is intended to illustrate the changes in both factors over time, which
may be the result of unintended, unforeseen consequences over a decade of
conflicts that have affected servicemembers as well as civilians.36

Figure 2. Army/Marine Suicide Rates and Public Opposition to the Iraq and Afghanistan
Conflicts

Such changes may not be inconsequential. Compared to their historical
predecessors, soldiers today are more easily connected to and keenly aware
of American social and political trends. They have access to television, the
internet, and telephonic communication. The juxtaposition and manifold differences between military and civilian life, and between military personnel and
civilians themselves, can now be observed even in the theater of combat with
unprecedented vividness and immediacy.
The foregoing considerations suggest that some of the difficulties soldiers encounter may arise from perceived conflicts between their own beliefs
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and expectations concerning military life and leadership on the one hand, and
the ever-changing realities to which they are exposed in their work and via
news and electronic media. Anomie occurs when a familiar and predictable
web of rules and regulations begins to unravel. Some soldiers may experience
the many changes and tensions within and around their reality as just such an
unraveling of the understanding and expectations that would otherwise bestow
a secure and predictable sense of belonging and purpose.

Fatalistic Suicide Revived
Durkheim identified fatalistic suicides as those caused by an excess of
regulation. Unfortunately, he allocated only a few paragraphs to his discussion
of this phenomenon. He may have considered fatalistic suicide the least likely
to occur, or perhaps he included it simply to round out the logic of his larger
theory. In any event, we would like to make the case for a bit more emphasis on
this category, and suggest that perhaps there is an element of the same sort of
fatalism involved in at least some military suicides.
For example, there are anecdotal reports of soldiers already in the
combat zone who for whatever reason find themselves unable to tolerate it any
longer. Lacking an honorable exit, these individuals commit an act of seemingly reckless heroism which results predictably in their own death. It seems
possible to us that in a climate of military, social, or personal stress, some
soldiers might feel trapped by the choices they have made, unable to find an
honorable way out.
The US military is an institution highly esteemed by society. Those
who volunteer for military service often gain new status and respect from
friends and family, and receive expressions of immediate respect and gratitude,
even from total strangers. As noted previously, many in the military regard
military culture as superior to that of civilian society. For someone whose sense
of identity and value accrues from military service, it may be all but impossible
to depart or dissent from core military beliefs, values, or behavioral norms. In
a context of perceived insurmountable stress, suicide may seem to be the only
solution for a soldier who can no longer tolerate combat.
Although military service in America is voluntary, many servicemembers are attracted to the profession by pay, benefits, and increasingly generous
enlistment and reenlistment bonuses. Legal professionals sometimes describe
lavish, irresistible compensation packages as the “golden handcuffs” binding
individuals to highly demanding jobs which eventually cause burnout. In the
military, compensation and other incentives need to increase as service becomes
less attractive; service incentives have increased during the last several years
and waivers37 have sometimes been used to meet force structure goals. Perhaps
the faltering economy has made military service a more attractive option, but
economic pressure exerts yet another source of pressure. There may be people
serving in the armed forces in part because they cannot afford to do otherwise.
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The New Frame
The Army and Marine Corps, the services that have been most directly
and heavily engaged in our current wars, are the services with the most dramatic increases in suicide rates. Neither repetitive deployment nor intensity
and duration of combat experience can completely explain these rising suicide
rates. Insofar as failed belongingness and perceived burdensomeness represent
a kind of final common pathway to suicide, the factors we have identified here
might be seen as contributing to the development of social isolation and loss of
connection. These, we know, are common features of many suicides. We think
that understanding suicide requires more than the measurement of stress-related
suffering, more than a focus on resilience, training, and preparation. Rather, it
should encompass consideration of the capacity of soldiers to meaningfully
interpret their experiences in military service.
The meaning an individual can make of his or her individual experience in service of a society is conditioned by the collective interpretation of
the larger events of which those experiences are a part. Civilian control of the
military means that each of us is ultimately responsible for what happens to our
military members, whether or not we ourselves have served, and whether or not
we feel qualified or comfortable to have that responsibility. That responsibility
includes the obligation to publicly examine our wars, the military asked to
fight them, and those doing the asking in the fullest and fairest way possible,
following the facts wherever they may lead.
Framing a problem is an essential step toward its eventual solution. It is
the step that narrows our attention to a critical subset of potential solutions. By
reframing the problem of military suicide more comprehensively to include the
considerations outlined above, we are forced to confront the consequences of
choices we have made more generally as a society. We have chosen to maintain
an all-volunteer military force; that choice affects not only the composition
and character of the military itself, but also the relationship of its members to
cultural expectations from within and without.
We have chosen to ask and allow a few to shoulder voluntarily the burden
once shared by all. We have chosen to permit our leaders to involve us in wars the
majority of citizens do not support. These choices have consequences that may
include the creation of a constellation of social, cultural, and political conditions
which conspire to elevate the rate of suicide in the Army and Marine Corps.
When rhetoric and reality are in conflict, cynicism flourishes. Americans
are now fiercely and unconditionally supportive of a military in which they are
no longer required to serve. Neither our military institutions nor the individuals
of which they are comprised can possibly live up to the standards of service,
sacrifice, and success ascribed to them in public discourse. Some soldiers may
see a reality which diverges from the public’s sanitized version. Elizabeth
Samet, Professor of English at the US Military Academy, recently noted the
“street theater” of many interactions between civilians and members of the
armed forces, culminating in the trite expression of gratitude, “Thank you for
your service.” Of this ritualized exchange, one officer she quotes remarked,
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“People thank me for my service, but they really don’t know what I’ve done.”38
Insofar as that is so, the soldier and his comrades are left to struggle alone with
whatever contradictions they may perceive, for the public seemingly has little
patience for anyone wishing to disturb the comfortable arrangement that now
exists between society and the military, an arrangement facilitated by the lack
of honest, thoughtful, and open dialogue.
Our dealings with and treatment of the citizens of Iraq and Afghanistan
may be one example of a topic that should merit more discussion. Counterinsurgency is a costly form of warfare: costly in blood and treasure, but psychologically costly, as well. The early Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT)
studies contain the suggestion that many soldiers serving in the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan may have adopted or tolerated a set of ethical standards that
deviate from those endorsed by the institutions of which they are a part, both
military and civil. If so, this clearly represents a failure of leadership in the
combat zone. If there is conflict between the beliefs and values we grow up with
and those seemingly forced upon us by the situations into which we are thrust,
then this in itself a potential source of social isolation. Questions pertaining
to such matters were dropped from the later MHAT studies, for legitimate
reasons. Finding a way to address these issues consistent with existing regulatory and legal frameworks, and to include these in pre- and post-deployment
discussions, may be essential steps in helping soldiers to process their attitudes,
experiences, and actions in a positive way.
Efforts at prevention of suicide in the military will be most effective when they are rooted in as complete and accurate an understanding of
the factors leading to suicide as possible. Examining military suicide through
a social and cultural frame demands that we ask questions about ourselves,
our military institutions and servicemembers, and our policies that may yield
uncomfortable answers. To shrink from that duty would indeed be to break
faith with those who have sacrificed incomparably more in our name.
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